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Non-state policing refers to the use of non-state (informal) actors, e.g. vigilante groups, 
private security firms, to carry out ‘law and order’ functions (preventing crime, investigating, 
detaining and punishing those responsible for crimes). Non-state policing is not a synonym for 
community policing (a much broader term, usually associated with formal police agencies) but 
there are overlaps between the two.  
Non-state policing emerges in situations where formal police agencies are unable to fulfil 
their roles, either because: they lack resources and capacity; they are corrupt and/or carry out 
human rights abuses; there is conflict and instability; people find it difficult to access formal 
security and justice mechanisms.  
Non-state policing providers are generally more accessible to citizens, have greater 
popular legitimacy, and are more responsive to local demands, as well as more 
accountable. There are also risks, though, notably of lack of representation (e.g. women, 
minorities) and of human rights abuses. 
Examples of non-state policing are to be found in many developing countries, particularly 
Africa. These vary hugely in nature, functioning and impact – both positive (reducing crime) 
and negative (e.g. human rights abuses). State responses to non-state policing providers also 
vary from hostility to collaboration.  
Northern Ireland and the former Soviet Union/Eastern European countries do have some non-
state actors involved in security functions, but they are better categorised as examples of formal 
police reform (as in of formal police agencies) in response to vastly changed circumstances, and 
the challenges faced in this. This review looks at more palpable examples of non-state policing: 
 Mexico: Policia Communitaria – formed in Mexico’s Guerrero State by indigenous 
communities in response to police failure to combat rising crime and violence. The Policia 
Communitaria have been very effective in reducing crime and making people, especially 
women, feel safe and able to move around freely. The relationship with the state is 
contested: while acknowledging the force’s effectiveness, there are concerns among 
state authorities that the Policia Communitaria operates outside the realm of law. But 
efforts to bring it into the state system have been rebuffed. 
 Nigeria: vigilante groups – numerous vigilante groups operate in Nigeria because of 
the ineffectiveness of the formal police. Some groups have joined to form larger 
networks. As well as security, some carry out social development and welfare functions. 
Though not recognised in national legislation, the state welcomes vigilante groups as 
long as they are not violent and abusive. Such groups have had a positive effect on 
reducing crime, but negative effects include human rights abuses, corruption and even 
enforcement of religious practices. 
 Papua New Guinea (PNG): diverse non-state policing providers – low police 
numbers, lack of access by citizens, and rising crime were factors in the emergence of 
non-state policing providers in PNG. These include groups derived from traditional 
structures, those enjoying overt state support, those with tacit state support, and those 
operating in direct contravention of the state. There is limited evidence of their 
effectiveness, but some forms (notably mercenaries and raskols or gangs) have carried 
out abuses. The state’s approach to non-state actors has shifted from ad hoc to one of 
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facilitating partnerships between these and state security providers: this is seen as a way 
of enhancing state legitimacy and promoting development. 
 Peru: rondas campesinas – rising cattle theft and other crime in rural northern Peru, 
and state ineffectiveness in responding to this, led to the formation of ‘peasant patrols’ to 
protect villages and property. Their role has expanded to other security functions, dispute 
resolution and even socioeconomic development projects. The rondas campesinas have 
been effective in reducing cattle theft and other crime, but many of their punishments 
violate human rights. The state’s response has varied over time: from overt hostility, to 
recognition in law, to more recent confrontation because of the rondas groups’ objections 
to planned hydropower projects in their area. 
 Tanzania: sungusungu committees – demobilisation of soldiers after the Uganda-
Tanzania war led to rising cattle theft and other crime, which the state was unable to 
control. Sungusungu committees were formed by traditional village assemblies, in order 
to patrol villages, apprehend and punish criminals, and recover stolen cattle (property). 
The sungusungu committees are seen as effective in providing security and empowering 
communities, but there are concerns about human rights abuses. The state has 
recognised and endorsed sungusungu committees because they meet local needs, and 
reflect the ruling party’s socialist ideology, but they have not been legalised.  
Donors have traditionally been reluctant to support non-state security and justice 
providers. This reluctance stems in large part from the state-centric approach characteristic of 
development assistance, as well as concerns about lack of representation and accountability of 
such groups, and human rights abuses committed by them. There are also risks that supporting 
such non-state actors could set up parallel structures (undermining state systems), could 
damage relations with host governments, and could cause harm in host states. In addition, 
practical challenges in programme management are much greater: requiring more resources, 
capacity and skills on the part of donors/implementing partners.  
There are strong arguments for donors to engage with non-state security and justice 
providers in their programming.: The on-ground reality in many developing countries is that it 
is non-state actors who provide security; such actors are more accessible, responsive, legitimate 
and accountable to citizens; and conventional security and justice programming (supporting state 
agencies) has not shown great results. 
Approaches for donors to overcome the risks and challenges involved in security and 
justice programmes with non-state actors include: developing knowledge-management 
strategies to acquire detailed local knowledge, and identify and mitigate risks; ensuring 
improvements in service delivery and state-building go hand in hand, instead of working against 
one another; stressing to host governments the benefits of supporting non-state policing; and 
pooling donor funds to meet high demands on staff time and capacity. Overall, donors need to 
show greater political acumen, flexibility and tolerance of higher levels of ambiguity and 
uncertainty in their programming. 
While community policing (as in involving formal police agencies) has been widely studied, this 
review found far less literature on non-state policing. The bulk was academic papers. The 
literature clearly points to a lack of representation of women in non-state policing providers; there 
is also some reference to the effects of these on women – in some cases enabling them to move 
freely (feel secure), in others subjecting them to human rights violations. No mention was found 
in the literature of persons with disabilities.  
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2. Non-state policing 
Role of non-state policing 
Policing can occur without, or with little, involvement of formal policing organisations (Baker, 
2008). In many parts of the world, citizens cannot rely on the state to provide security and justice, 
and hence policing is not undertaken by formal police agencies but by a more plural set of actors, 
including traditional authorities, neighbourhood watch groups and private security companies 
(Denney, 2015). It has been estimated that 80-90% of disputes in the Global South are resolved 
through informal mechanisms (Albrecht & Kyed, 2011: 3). The phenomenon of non-state policing 
is particularly widespread in Africa. 
Derks (2012) identifies a number of reasons why citizens might not be able to rely on the state:  
 The police and other agencies lack the resources, capacity and skills to provide effective 
protection, and hence are unable to fulfil their roles. 
 The police and other security agencies might be corrupt, colluding with criminal 
organisations, or used as a tool for achieving political aims. Often, they also display a 
flagrant disregard for human rights. In such cases, ordinary citizens cannot trust the 
state’s security and justice apparatus, or they are afraid and see them as a threat to their 
safety rather than a source of security.  
 In countries where the process of state‐building is embryonic or fragile, formal state 
security and justice institutions are often paralleled by other structures of power and 
public order. They can therefore be perceived and treated as alien bodies, set up to 
extend centralised power by the national government, previous colonial administrations, 
or even the international community (as is the case for the police and military in, for 
example, Afghanistan and Iraq). 
 Formal institutions speak a language local people do not speak (sometimes literally, but 
also in the sense that their juridical language is alien to people’s everyday lives), are 
often located far away and their services are expensive. As a result, many people lack 
security and access to justice, particularly those in the poorer and more remote areas of 
fragile and (post-)conflict states. 
The positive aspects of non-state policing include that they are typically assumed to be more 
accessible to citizens, in terms of proximity, language used and methods, to have greater popular 
legitimacy, to be responsive to local demands, to have horizontal accountability, and to offer a 
cost-effective means of establishing security (Cross, 2013: 6; Baker, 2008b). Risks are that – if 
run by volunteers – they can be unsustainable; they could be susceptible to corruption, abuses of 
power and manipulation by local elites; they are often not (fully) compliant with international 
human rights standards; they lack the tools, skills and techniques for modern policing, e.g. 
forensic science, record-keeping (Baker, 2008). However, Cross (2013: 6) notes that ‘some of 
the commonly observed problems with non-state policing, such as use of corporal punishment, 
torture and persecution of marginalised groups, may not be any more likely to blight non-state 





Non-state policing vs. community policing 
Non-state policing is not a synonym for community policing but there are overlaps between the 
two. Non-state policing refers to the use of non-state (informal) actors, e.g. neighbourhood 
groups, to carry out ‘law and order’ functions (preventing crime, investigating, detaining and 
punishing those responsible for crimes), while community policing is a much broader term. There 
is no precise definition for it; rather, community policing ‘is a vague and ambiguous term, 
meaning many things to many people’ (Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 2). However, there is 
consensus on the key concepts involved in community policing – partnership, community 
consent, accountability, a service orientation and preventative/proactive/responsive/problem-
focused approaches to crime (Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 2). While community policing has often 
been understood as initiatives between the formal police and communities, in fact it could be led 
by or involve communities themselves, by donors or by a range of policing providers – including 
non-state (informal) police groups (Denney, 2015: 9). 
Forms of non-state policing 
Non-state policing can take many different forms: rich neighbourhoods putting a fence around a 
compound and employing a private security company for protection; communities (in poorer 
environments) setting up neighbourhood watch groups; traditional forms of authority (notably in 
tribal societies) being modified to meet modern security needs; vigilante groups, and so on.  
Johnson (1991, cited in Baker, 2002: 35-37) identifies three broad types of non-state police: 
1. Autonomous citizen responses – these are groups that not only act independently of the 
state police, but often do not cooperate with it and can be prepared to break the law to 
achieve their goals of protection and investigation (or even trials and sentencing). They 
are characterised by reactive, ad hoc and often violent methods of control. While they 
tend to be small and loosely organised, some are larger and more formal. They are often 
called vigilante groups. 
2. Responsible citizen responses – these are activities which are carried out with the 
approval or cooperation of the public police. However, these ‘responsible’ groups do not 
necessarily abstain from violence and can engage in assaults and attacks. 
3. Private security industry – these may or may not be subject to state regulation, and could 
undertake illegal activities, including misuse of weapons.  
Baker (2002) notes that there are significant differences between entities along the non-policing 
spectrum in their organisational structure, legality and how they define social deviance and the 
type of ‘order’ they wish to establish. But he argues that they also have much in common (Baker, 
2002: 30):  
 all are forces of coercion engaged by groups of society to preserve social order; 
 they arise from communal dissatisfaction with state policing services; 
 they are often continuations of an established culture of self-reliance; 
 they tend to be controlled only poorly or not at all by state institutions and have minimal 
accountability to the public; 
 whatever their form, they are shaped, not by the national public agenda, but largely by 
their clients, who individually or communally provide the financial and/or social support 
for the groups to operate on their behalf.  
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Northern Ireland and former Soviet Union 
This review found no evidence of significant non-state policing mechanisms emerging in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or in Northern Ireland. In both 
contexts, the literature refers to ‘community policing’ but in the sense of formal police agencies 
adapting their operations to be more engaged with the communities they serve – not in the sense 
of non-state community bodies being established to carry out policing functions. References 
were found to sectarian community groups involved in combatting criminality in Northern Ireland, 
but little detail. 
Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland the police service was seen by citizens as an instrument of the state and a 
symbol of oppression, unrepresentative (dominated by Protestants and Unionists), 
unaccountable to the public and distrusted by many (especially in the Catholic community). 
Following the Troubles, the Patten Commission1 recommended a community-based approach to 
policing in Northern Ireland, introducing mechanisms of accountability, seeking to develop an 
effective and democratic police force and to improve citizen-police relations (Brogden & Nijhar, 
2005, cited in Jenkins, 2013). However, the Commission report makes it clear that community 
policing means ‘policing with the community’: ‘What we emphatically do not mean by “community 
policing” is vigilante groups policing neighbourhoods with baseball bats, or, at the other extreme, 
what… [has been] described as “sitting around the trees, holding hands and singing Kumbaya”’ 
(ICPNI, 1999, cited in Jenkins, 2013).  
The literature details the progress (or lack of) made in bringing about a reformed, service-
oriented police service in Northern Ireland. While militarism is no longer evident, and a degree of 
accountability has been established, Catholic and Protestant communities still have vastly 
divergent perceptions of the policing, and community policing has largely been reduced to 
problem-solving (Brogden & Nijhar, 2005, cited in Jenkins, 2013). Topping (2008: 391) echoes 
this, noting that the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has been radically transformed in 
the post-Patten era, but ‘the change to policing on the ground has been largely unaffected, and in 
many areas of the Province policing largely mirrors the reactive style of policing characteristic of 
the Troubles, albeit in a relative peace-time context’. He identifies a number of factors accounting 
for the limited progress: the deep-rooted divisions in Northern Ireland society and the 
complexities of policing in a transitional society; institutional inertia within the PSNI; and 
community resistance (Topping, 2008: 391). Byrne (2014: 4) highlights a further two issues 
regularly faced by the PSNI: one, the continued presence of dissident Republic armed groups 
using tactics such as shootings, mortar attacks and pipe bombs, aimed largely at the security 
services; and two, ‘the PSNI continues to be the arbiter for the failure of politics to address the 
sensitive issues of flags, commemorations and parades, and the legacy of the past’. Decisions 
on these by local councils and the Northern Ireland Parades Commission have led some 
individuals/groups to respond with rioting and public disorder.  
This review found only one paper (Topping & Byrne, 2016) which refers to non-state policing 
providers in Northern Ireland. Undertaken by the community/voluntary sector in the Province, 
‘they do so in a way which is neither explicitly ordered, nor randomly conceived’ (Topping & 
Byrne, 2016: 14). Such groups go beyond organisational rules and hierarchies, relying on 
                                                   
1 Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland chaired by Chris Patten. 
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relationships to influence behaviour and change minds; it is this fluid, amorphous nature which 
allows them to access virtually all community spheres of life and manage the complexity of 
relations (Topping & Byrne, 2016: 14). They have the ability to act effectively because they each 
have a degree of local authority; they have contributed to reducing crime in Northern Ireland 
(Topping & Byrne, 2016). However, such groups operate on a sectarian basis in Loyalist or 
Republican communities – more in the latter because these were more dissociated from the state 
policing apparatus. The authors note that since much of this ‘shadow policing’ activity is 
undertaken along sectarian lines, it is ‘clearly not conducive to an overarching public security 
“good” for the country’ (Topping & Byrne, 2016: 12). However, the paper suggests that the PSNI 
could benefit from ‘co-opting’ such groups, e.g. gaining knowledge, services and capital not 
otherwise available to the police, and through those groups being able to achieve greater 
voluntary compliance within their communities. 
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
Post-1989, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries also faced the challenge of 
adjusting to a vastly different environment, in this case marked by: the disappearance of 
command economies and the onrush of the free market system; a reduction in resources for the 
police; pressure on them to reform from highly centralised, authoritarian forces to a more 
democratic police force serving citizens; and an explosion in crime rates (Caperini & Marenin, 
2005). Brogden and Nijhar (2005, cited in Jenkins, 2013) highlight the difficulties faced in shifting 
from a ruling party-centric approach to adopting community policing: ‘Officials may actively 
oppose the decentralisation of policing, and police forces characterised by low morale, poor pay, 
limited resources and little tradition of the use of discretion, are ill-equipped to adopt a 
community-oriented style of policing’. A further challenge was lack of demand for community 
policing by citizens: ‘primarily driven by a human rights perspective, these projects often presume 
too much about local priorities. Effective crime-fighting may be more important than human rights 
in these contexts’ (Brogden & Nijhar, 2005).  
The greatest progress in establishing effective, accountable and legitimate police was seen in 
some European states, notably the former East Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Slovenia; by contrast, police agencies in many Soviet successor states continued to be 
marked by authoritarian tendencies, and remained militarised, centralised and politicised 
(Caperini & Marenin, 2005). The only example of ‘non-state’ policing in the literature is the rise of 
the private security industry in Russia, in response to the rise in crime and the ineffectiveness of 
state agencies to combat it. Many of these private security firms have strong connections with 
the state police, e.g. hiring former police as security personnel (Caperini & Marenin, 2005). 
In summary, while Northern Ireland and the former Soviet Union/Eastern European countries do 
have some non-state security actors, they are better categorised as examples of (formal) police 
reform in response to vastly changed circumstances, and the challenges in carrying those out.  
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3. Case studies 
Mexico 
Background 
Mexico is seeing a rise in community self-defence groups. Merino and Hernandez (2013: 150) 
argue that such groups ‘represent a social response to the failures of the State security agency in 
ensuring peace and order in their communities’. As of 2013, nine states in the country had 
‘vigilante’ police groups (Merino & Hernandez, 2013: 150). One example is the Policia 
Communitaria (Community Police) in Guerrero, one of the poorest states in Mexico. Plagued for 
many years by violence, insecurity and assaults, and given the failure of state and federal 
authorities to control the situation, ‘the largely indigenous communities of these regions decided 
to establish their own public security system: the Policia Communitaria’ (Sierra, 2005: 57-58). It 
emerged out of a history of traditional authorities organising life in the region (Merino & 
Hernandez, 2013).  
Functioning 
The Policia Communitaria was established in 1995: as of 2015, the non-state force has more 
than 700 locally elected volunteers for a population of approximately 100,000 (Denney, 2015: 
11). Sierra (2005: 58) explains how the system works: in each participating community, the local 
assembly elects between eight and twelve police officers, who will be responsible over the 
following year for surveillance and detention functions. These officers work fifteen-day rotations 
in different communities, coordinating with their counterparts from the other communities. The 
labour of all participants in the system is provided without pay and is seen as an obligation of 
service to the community. Resources to maintain police facilities and the radio system are 
provided by elected municipal authorities.   
Initially, the Policia Communitaria guarded rural roads and handed over suspected criminals to 
the state prosecutor (Denney, 2015). However, on seeing that the state authorities released 
those arrested almost as soon as they were arrested on the grounds of ‘lack of evidence’, in 
1997 the Regional Coordinator of Communitarian Authorities was established to administer 
justice (Sierra, 2005: 58). Suspected criminals stand before a community assembly and respond 
to the case against them before the assembly votes on their guilt and punishment, usually 
combining community service with some nights spent in jail (Denney, 2015). 
Impact  
The Policia Communitaria has been hugely successful in reducing delinquency, insecurity and 
violence in the region (Sierra, 2005; Merino & Hernandez, 2013). Sierra (2005: 62) stresses the 
positive impact the group has had on local women: ‘they can now move about without fear of 
being assaulted, raped or robbed. This has implied a fundamental change for them and their 
families. Hence women actively support the Policia and the participation of their husbands and 
sons in the surveillance system’.  
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State response 
The government response to the success of Policia Communitaria has been ambiguous. On the 
one hand, authorities have been forced to recognise the massive contribution the group has 
made in bringing about peace and security in Guerrero. On the other hand, there were those 
among the authorities who argued that the group was acting outside the realm of the law. The 
military shared this perspective, and – with a significant presence in the region to combat drug 
trafficking and guerrilla groups – actively blocked and interfered with the group, e.g. detaining 
people for not having arms permits (Sierra, 2005). The state government has been unable to 
condemn the group because of its success and the popular support it enjoys, but they have tried 
to ‘control’ it by bringing it into the formal system – something the Policia Communitaria have 
rejected. Their relationship with the state therefore remains contested.  
Nigeria 
Background 
The use of non-state policing is widespread in Nigeria, particularly in areas with a long history of 
ethno-religious and political violence, e.g. Plateau, Kano and Kaduna states, as well as in the 
capital Abuja (Ogbozor, 2016: 1). The prevalence of such groups reflects shortcomings in the 
formal police: as well as being under-staffed, the Nigeria Police Force suffers from insufficient 
funding and equipment, mismanagement, abuse of power and corruption (Ogbozor, 2016). 
Ogbozor (2016: 3) points out that, ‘Vigilantes flourish not only in places where the state lacks the 
capacity to protect citizens from crime, but also where the state is believed to be corrupt or 
untrustworthy’. 
Functioning 
Non-state police are generally vigilante groups in Nigeria. Ettanibi et al. (2004) identify four main 
types:  
i. Neighbourhood or community vigilante groups organised by community associations; 
ii. Ethnic vigilante groups organised along ethnic lines to defend ethnic interests; 
iii. Religious vigilantes with faith roots; 
iv. State-sponsored groups that operate with the support of local governments. 
These types are not rigid or exclusive; one group might combine the features of two or more of 
these types. Hisba, for example, is an informal security group that has faith and state-sponsored 
roots. Of the many informal policing groups in Nigeria, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) is 
the largest with millions of members (Ogbozor, 2016: 3). This was formed through the unification 
of lots of diverse, small, localised long-standing vigilante groups in the country. VGN has 
operations at local, state, regional and national level.  
The operational structures of voluntary policing groups vary: some groups have well-documented 
structures, operational guidelines, and administrative procedures, whereas others have no 
written operational manuals or administrative or financial procedures (Ogbozor, 2016: 9). 
According to Ogbozor (2016), the activities of vigilante groups are largely obscure because they 
operate without a legal mandate.  
In terms of function, irrespective of structure, all informal security groups are responsible for 
safeguarding lives and property in their communities. ‘(T)he primary duties of vigilantes are to 
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complement security agencies, gather intelligence information, and arrest and hand over 
suspected criminals to the police’ (Ogbozor, 2016: 9). Some groups combine provision of 
security with social development activities. Hisba’s functions, for example, extend far beyond 
combatting criminality, to traffic control, humanitarian relief and social welfare, and ‘protecting the 
Islamic faith’ by, for example, monitoring social activities, discouraging immoral behaviour and 
supporting moral standards (Ogbozor, 2016).   
Impact 
The literature identifies positive and negative aspects of vigilante groups in Nigeria. Surveys of 
communities have found that most people prefer the informal security sector to the formal police 
(Ettanibi et al., 2004; Ogbozor, 2016). This preference is based on three factors: availability, trust 
and effectiveness (Ogbozor, 2016). The groups are recognised as having a beneficial impact on 
law and order. However, there are also concerns about human rights abuses and about the 
groups’ lack of formal accountability (some are accountable to local leaders or village heads). 
VGN, for example, is linked to violations of human rights, arbitrary arrests, forced detention and 
torture; it also levies and collects taxes from community members (Ogbozor, 2016). The Bakassi 
Boys originated as a self-help group to confront crime in market towns and was later legalised 
and commandeered by the state; however, it was then criminalised because of severe abuses 
(Denney & Jenkins, 2013).  
State response 
While most Nigerian states and local government authorities have legalised the activities of 
vigilante groups, Nigeria does not have a national vigilante law. VGN officially registered as a 
non-profit organisation with the federal government, but the absence of national legislation has 
made it difficult for VGN to attract federal support (Ogbozor, 2016: 15). Denney and Jenkins 
(2013: 22) write that the Nigerian government welcomes the establishment of informal policing 
groups as long as they: register with the police; submit to police screening; do not carry 
weapons; and do not detain suspects, but rather hand them over to the police. 
Papua New Guinea 
Background 
From the late 1960s onwards, Papua New Guinea (PNG) saw a growth in major law and order 
problems: raskol (gang) crime commenced in the towns and gradually extended to many rural 
areas; inter-group conflict (‘tribal fighting’) that had been suppressed during colonial times began 
to reappear in parts of the Highlands; and there was increasing availability of modern firearms 
(Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 338).  
The police in PNG are hampered by a number of factors: low police-to-population ratios 
(estimated at 1:1121 in 2002 – the UN recommends 1:450) (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 338); lack 
of resources and poor working conditions, undermining morale; limited coverage of state police 
(and hence access of citizens to police) because of largely rural populations, inadequacies in 
infrastructure and topographical challenges. On top of these are problems of growing corruption 
within the organisation, a progressive politicisation of senior ranks, and ill-discipline and human 
rights abuses. People do not report crimes because responses are poor (due to lack of personnel 
and resources), but also because of fear of police violence, including sexual assault (Dinnen & 
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McLeod, 2009). ‘In PNG, fear of police has existed for many years and is especially pronounced 
among women, youth, and the urban poor, as well as amongst rural villagers who have 
experienced heavy-handed police actions’ (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 343). As a result, for most 
citizens everyday security is managed through local, non-state mechanisms.  
Functioning 
Many of these non-state mechanisms have roots in the tradition of small-scale, self-regulating 
societies in rural areas in which the state has a limited presence, but some have developed with 
no reference to traditional authority (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). Dinnen and McLeod (2009: 344-
345) identify the different types of informal policing initiatives in PNG and give examples of each:  
 Traditional authorities – chiefs and big-men drawing on traditional authority play an 
important role in mediating disputes and dealing with local troublemakers. Often informal 
policing arrangements mimic aspects of state organisation, e.g. in the Minj District of 
PNG’s Western Highlands Province, the people of Domil set up their own system of 
governance, with responsibility for security lying with designated ‘police’ working under a 
‘police minister’; 
 Relatively autonomous extensions of state agencies – the community auxiliary police of 
PNG were created by state police to compensate for their lack of resources. Community-
based proxies are appointed, provided with uniforms and monthly allowances to police 
their own communities. They are subject, in theory at least, to supervision and direction 
by state police; 
 Informal mechanisms operating with tacit state approval – these include informal 
responses to local security issues that have sprung up in many urban settlements. Tacit 
state approval is often provided through the involvement of individual officials and 
agencies, such as a sympathetic police station commander, welfare officer, or 
magistrate. For example, Peace Committees set up in Saraga, a Port Moresby 
settlement. Comprising leaders of the different ethnic groups, these committees provide 
mediation services, organise sporting and income-generating activities for local youth, 
have drawn up a set of community ‘laws’, and, work closely with a local security company 
and officers from a nearby police station 
 Informal mechanisms operating in direct contravention of state authority – At the ‘illegal’ 
and oppressive end of the informal spectrum, local raskols often provide informal policing 
services, such as the recovery of stolen property or administration of punishment to those 
deemed to be in breach of community norms. These services may be undertaken for 
monetary reward or in furtherance of other interests such as the need to ensure a safe 
haven and avoid unwelcome attention from external authorities. There has also been a 
rise in use of private mercenaries in parts of PNG (see below); by the 1990s, private 
security had become one of the fastest growing industries in PNG. 
Impact  
The literature highlights the fact that citizens in PNG are reluctant to use state police, preferring 
informal security mechanisms, but does not give an assessment of how effective the latter are in 
restoring law and order. There is also evidence of negative effects of some informal entities, 
notably urban raskols. These often have close associations with political and business leaders 
and provide services such as personal security, intimidation of political or business rivals, and 
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even carrying out contract killings in return for money or other favours (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 
345). Similarly, mercenaries being used in the Highlands are often equipped with high-powered 
weapons and ammunition and are used to strategic advantage in tribal fights and elections, as 
well as for contract killings (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 345). 
State response 
In recent years the state has shifted from an ad hoc policy approach, to actively trying to improve 
the alignment and coordination between the state and non-state providers of policing and other 
justice services; this is reflected in its national law and justice policy agenda (Dinnen & McLeod, 
2009: 349). While acknowledging the need to strengthen state agencies, ‘it also places emphasis 
on mobilising informal resources and local knowledge to assist in crime prevention, community 
safety, dispute resolution, as well as the diversion and rehabilitation of offenders’ (Dinnen & 
McLeod, 2009: 349). This partnership approach is seen as an important way to enhance the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the state, to save costs for the state, to contribute to broader 
community development goals, and thereby serve as a more holistic and sustainable approach to 
the prevention and management of crime in disadvantaged communities (Dinnen & McLeod, 
2009). The reasoning is: ‘increased involvement of non-state actors need not eclipse the state, 
but rather, can “buy time” and relieve pressure in a manner that can allow legitimate state 
institutions to emerge or regenerate. They can also help arrest the deteriorating quality of life at 
grassroots levels’ (Dupont et al., cited in Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 349).  
Peru 
Background 
The rondas campesinas or peasant patrols in rural Peru emerged in the 1970s against the 
backdrop of the collapse of the peasant economy, increasing cases of cattle theft by organised 
gangs, and the inability of the Peruvian state to respond effectively and provide security for 
peasants (Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 22). Groups of men formed to patrol villages at night to 
protect their homes, crops and cattle. The rondas campesinas started in northern Peru, 
specifically in the province of Cajamarca, as well as Piura (Palomino, 1996: 113). The success of 
those initial groups in bringing cattle rustling and violence under control led to neighbouring 
areas, other provinces and eventually the whole Andean region setting up similar groups.  
Functioning 
Palomino (1996: 114) explains the structure of the patrols: The rondas consist of male peasants 
between the ages of 18 and 60, in groups of three to 15. They work in shifts, established 
according to the number of rondero groups in the community, and the territory being divided into 
defined areas. A supervisor controls the rondas groups in each area, while a Central Committee 
(representing the whole community and elected at a general assembly by all the members of the 
community) oversees all the areas. 
Patrols initially caught thieves and handed them over to the police, but they have increasingly 
adopted a broader and more independent judicial and governance role in the context of an 
ineffective state system (Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 22). Palomino (1996: 115) argues that the 
effectiveness of the rondas in contrast to the insufficiency of State action caused the expansion 
of their functions to handle other types of problems, such as family and land disputes, and even 
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crimes of seduction and rape. The rondas have also undertaken local projects of a social and 
economic nature: ‘There are communities where the committees have invested funds collected 
from those who do not patrol and from fines to establish communal drug supplies and in a few 
instances to build small irrigation projects’ (Gitlitz & Rojas, 1983: 190).  
Impact 
The rondas campesinas have had a positive effect of significantly reducing cattle theft and other 
criminality in the areas in which they operate (Denney & Jenkins, 2013). Gitlitz and Rojas (1983: 
187) note that the rondas, ‘function primarily as a deterrent – they are designed not so much to 
capture thieves as to discourage them – and they have been very successful. Rustling has all but 
disappeared’.  
However, there are concerns about the extent to which the groups take the law into their own 
hands (Gitlitz & Rojas, 1983). Punishments imposed by the rondas can range from the 
repossession of stolen cattle or goods to physical sanctions (such as whipping and cold night-
time baths). ‘The objective is not only to punish the individual physically or economically but also 
morally. To do this, the castigated are usually forced to walk naked through town with signs 
hanging from their necks stating the acts they have committed’ (Palominos, 1996: 116). Gitlitz 
and Rojas (1983: 191) point out that there are few controls over the way the rondas treat 
suspects, and their methods are undoubtedly harsh. This creates potential for abuse: ‘If the 
ronda committees were to decide to collaborate with rustlers, to extort, or to engage in personal 
vendettas, they could easily become dictatorial’ (Gitlitz & Rojas, 1983: 191). This review was 
unable to find more recent literature in English on the rondas campesinas, but a recent travel 
guide on Peru recommends that tourists give rondas a small ‘service payment’ when they 
encounter them on rural roads.2 However, the literature does not point to large-scale corruption 
on the part of the rondas campesinas. 
State response 
The response of successive Peruvian governments to the rondas campesinas has varied hugely. 
In the 1970s, the Belaunde Terry administration openly opposed their activities: it felt that ‘to 
acknowledge and legalize their existence would mean the establishment of parallel institutions, 
depriving the police and their own jurisdictional authorities of some of their functions’ (Palomino, 
1996: 117). It responded by increasing the police presence in areas where the rondas were 
active, and maltreating them, with many charged with common crimes. This only strengthened 
support for the rondas among the peasants and gave them greater legitimacy (Palomino, 1996).  
Later governments viewed the rondas campesinas differently. The Garcia government passed 
the Rondas Campesinas law in 1986, which gave the rondas legal standing to resist attacks from 
the police, and the authority to protect individual and community property (Palominos, 1996). Law 
27908, passed in 2003, went further in recognising the rondas ‘as an autonomous and 
democratic community organization that can establish dialogue with the State, support the 
military in the judicial functions of the rural and indigenous communities, assist in conflict 
resolution and perform functions of extrajudicial conciliation under the Constitution and the Law’.3 




While the rondas campesinas have been granted some formal legal recognition, they remain 
largely an entirely informal organisation (Denney & Jenkins, 2013). 
In recent years, relations between rondas groups in some areas, notably Cajamarca, and the 
authorities have become far more confrontational. This stems from local people’s opposition to a 
planned hydroelectric power project (Chadin 2) on the Maranon River, one of the Amazon’s main 
tributaries. The project will lead to flooding of huge swathes of agricultural land, destroying 
people’s livelihoods and homes (Goyzueta, 2015).  
Tanzania 
Background 
The demobilisation of soldiers in the aftermath of the Tanzania/Uganda conflict led to increasing 
insecurity and violence associated with cattle-rustling and banditry in Tanzania (Denney & 
Jenkins, 2013: 22). The state was largely ineffective in managing the violence and as a result, in 
the early 1980s, villages responded autonomously, forming defence groups called sungusungu in 
order to confront these gangs of thieves (Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 22).  
Functioning 
Groups of men patrol their village on a rotational system, protecting property, apprehending and 
arresting thieves, deciding on punishments, and recovering stolen cattle. Punishments can be 
severe, including whipping, shunning and family banishment, heavy fines, beatings and breaking 
the ankles of thieves (Heald, 2009, cited in Jenkins, 2013). The groups have also been used to 
retrieve women who had left their husbands or eloped, thereby depriving their parents of bride-
wealth (Cross, 2013: 51).  
The sungusungu committees are well-rooted in traditional governance mechanisms and elected 
by democratic village assemblies called iritongo (Denney, 2015: 11). The iritongo are democratic 
assemblies which are led by the ruling generation, but where all adult men are allowed to speak. 
Trials are usually heard first by the sungusungu committee, but they are always held before the 
entire iritongo (Heald, 2009, cited in Jenkins, 2013). 
Impact 
The sungusungu have been praised as ‘arguably the most successful form of community policing 
in Eastern Africa’ (Heald, 2009, cited in Denney, 2015: 11), but have also been implicated in the 
systematic use of torture (Cross, 2013: 57). Nevertheless, the sungusungu have enabled 
communities to take back power and have heralded a new vision of community responsibility for 
local safety and security (Jenkins, 2013). 
State response 
There are strong links between the iritongo and the local administration. While government 
officials do not usually attend the iritongo, minutes and reports are communicated with divisional 
and district secretaries (Heald, 2009, cited in Jenkins, 2013). Since the sungusungu movement 
met a need and resonated with the socialist ideology of the state, it was later sanctioned by the 
government and incorporated within official state policy (Cross, 2013: 52). However, Heald 
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(2009, cited in Jenkins, 2013: 28) notes that, while the Tanzanian state has allowed sungusungu 
groups to codify their own laws and exact their own forms of punishment, it has ultimately been 
‘unable to flout its own judiciary by fully legalising them’. ‘The groups occupy a quasi-legal space 
and consequently are, to an extent, left in danger of prosecution’ (Jenkins, 2013: 28).  
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5. Role of international donors 
Engagement with non-state actors? 
The literature points to donor reluctance to engage with non-state actors, but also highlights the 
reasons why they should do so.  
As seen in this review, governments differ in their approaches to non-state policing: some see 
such practices as useful supplements to the limited capacity of state policing, and can even co-
opt such practices (e.g. the sungusungu in Tanzania), but others view them as a threat to 
government control (Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 10). Donors seem to be similarly ambivalent, 
regarding some non-state practices as potentially useful ways to address community needs but 
seeing others as ‘beyond the pail’ (Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 10). Overall, though, donor 
engagement with non-state policing providers is very limited: informal justice and policing 
systems have been largely neglected by most development assistance (Denney & Jenkins, 
2013).  
Donor reluctance stems in large part from a state-centric approach to development assistance 
and state-building, and traditional neglect of non-state actors:  
Belief in the universality of state structures has reinforced a standardised model of state 
policing derived from the industrialised metropolitan countries. The promotion of 
‘international best practice’ in police organisations and practice, as in other aspects of 
state-building, enhances this proclivity, as does the deployment of large numbers of 
international police officers with a powerful predisposition to build in their own image 
(Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 335). 
Dinnen and McLeod (2009) argue that this reduces the opportunity to consider more innovative 
approaches to the governance of security, specifically to facilitating constructive interaction 
between state and non-state policing and justice providers. Denney and Jenkins (2013) stress 
that the reality in many contexts, particularly in fragile and conflict affected states, is that there is 
a plurality of policing providers and not a state monopoly on this function. In pluralist 
environments, where non-state policing is a reality for many, it is important ‘to engage creatively 
with the broader spectrum of local policing providers so as to maximise the prospects of them 
working together in a mutually beneficial and supportive manner’ (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 335). 
Scheye (2009) comments that the results of ‘conventional’ rule of law assistance programmes – 
building capacity of state institutions – have not been impressive.  
A second concern is that support for non-state policing can mean working with groups that have 
weak democratic representation and accountability. Representation of women and minorities, in 
particular, is often low in non-state policing structures, because these reflect power relations 
within those communities. But Dinnen and McLeod (2009) point out that such lack of 
representation of women and minority groups is not unique to non-state actors: the same issue is 
typically found in state policing and justice bodies in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). 
‘(I)t is most frequently pointed out in relation to non-state practices, often (erroneously) 
considered to be more arbitrary given that they can operate in violation of the law’ (Dinnen & 
McLeod, 2009: 34). They also argue that ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ are not static or fixed and, 
through the right support, can be challenged. They also note that this is true of all community 
policing practices (i.e. including those involving formal police agencies).   
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A related area of concern in supporting non-state security providers is that some may carry out 
human rights violations. Donors are particularly wary of the negative publicity that could result 
from them (inadvertently) giving support to a local/non-state actor that turns out not to respect 
human rights or is involved in criminal activity (Derks, 2012). ‘Although a similar situation could 
easily arise when supporting state security and justice agencies (which just as often violate 
human rights, or are engaged in crime), the sense among policy‐makers is that this risk is more 
acute when it comes to local/non‐state actors’ (Derks, 2012: 3). Scheye (2009: iii) argues that the 
underlying pragmatic and programmatic issue is three-fold: one, whether non-state providers are 
worst offenders than their state counterparts; two, whether they are more or less amenable to 
improving their performance; and three, how to most effectively remedy the violations. He claims 
that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that non-state actors are more prone to 
committing human rights violations than state agencies. 
A study by the Clingendael Institute (Derks, 2012) identifies a number of risks associated with 
donor programmes targeting informal security and justice providers in relation to the wider effects 
of these on the host state:  
1. These could lead to the creation of parallel security and justice service delivery structures 
– as well as being inefficient, this could be detrimental if local non-state and higher-level 
state bodies compete for resources and authority and work against each other.  
2. Such programmes could damage relations with host governments – almost all security 
and justice programmes result from a negotiation process between donor and host 
government. The latter can see local/non-state actors as competing with them for 
authority, or as a threat to stability and peace. Efforts to support them could be seen as 
interference in domestic affairs. 
3. Support for local/non-state actors could cause harm – a) by upsetting relationships and 
power balances between central state agencies and non-state actors, as well as between 
local actors; b) by inadvertently creating or reinforcing extortion rackets (hence reducing 
security for local people) in the effort to make local security providers self-sufficient; or c) 
by ‘damaging a good thing’ – overwhelming small-scale non-state actors with an influx of 
large amounts of funding and associated reporting requirements.    
There are also significant practical challenges concerning programme management. One relates 
to the sustainability of support given to non-state actors: a lot of development assistance is for 
capacity building and entails provision of equipment and training so that actors can provide 
services (Derks, 2012). With non-state actors there can be questions about long-term 
effectiveness. A second challenge is that such programmes will be very demanding in terms of 
staff time and skills, since the capacity of non-state actors will be limited and donors will have to 
backstop their activities substantively and organisationally (Scheye, 2009; Derks, 2012). Donors 
will also have to engage with a multiplicity of non-state actors (given that most will be localised 
and small-scale), exacerbating capacity stresses. Implementing partners on ground may be 
resistant to the idea of including non-state security and justice actors in programmes (Derks, 
2012). 
Nonetheless, the literature calls for greater donor engagement with non-state policing and justice 
systems. This is necessary given the important roles they play in many contexts; often attracting 
more support from the local population than the state police; being affordable, accessible and 
consistent with local values; on the basis of what works; the speed with which they can resolve 
disputes and their ability to enforce decisions (Scheye, 2009; Denney & Jenkins, 2013). 
‘Because they are more trusted and accessible, they are, often, more effective in delivering 
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security and justice to the population of a state than many state agencies, factors that should not 
and cannot be overlooked in donor support efforts’ (Scheye, 2009: iii). Donors are urged to 
develop strategies for working with informal policing providers to take advantage of their benefits 
(Denney & Jenkins, 2013). Marks et al. (2009, cited in Denney & Jenkins, 2013: 34) call for a 
new imagining of community policing that moves ‘beyond a community policing narrative that the 
police own and control, toward a model that accounts for police limitations and the range of 
alternative policing sources that are already there’.  
Approaches 
The Clingendael Institute study makes a number of recommendations to overcome the risks and 
challenges donors face in engaging with non-state providers in security and justice programming 
(Derks, 2012: 1-4):  
 In order to minimise the chance of supporting actors who prove unreliable or 
unaccountable donors need to develop: a knowledge‐management strategy that will help 
them acquire a detailed level of knowledge of the local context; tools and mechanisms, 
including monitoring tools, that identify and address existing risks and mitigate future 
risks. 
 To overcome risk-averse behaviour among domestic decision-makers, a communication 
strategy is needed to make donor governments’ domestic audiences aware of the 
advantages of supporting non‐state actors as well as of the risks and ways to attenuate 
these. 
 To make sure that improvements in service delivery and state‐building go hand in hand, 
instead of working against each other, bottom‐up and top‐down approaches need to be 
integrated. This can be done by ensuring that effective linkages between local/non‐state 
and central state actors are either created or improved upon. Alternatively, thinking about 
security and justice in terms of (transferable) functions, not form, can allow programmes 
in which functions are initially provided by local/non‐state actors, and then gradually 
handed over to the state, as its capacities to provide security and justice grow. 
 To ensure relations with host governments aren’t damaged, donors need to apply their 
diplomatic skills to persuade host governments to agree to the inclusion of local/non‐state 
actors in security and justice programmes. They can stress to governments that 
local/non‐state actors are integral ingredients of overall security and justice delivery, and 
that therefore including them in security and justice development will be beneficial for the 
central government as well. Donors can also take a portfolio approach to negotiations, in 
which they make support for local/non‐state actors part of a package deal.  
 Alternatively, donors could provide support indirectly, through non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or trade unions, rather than directly through an official security and 
justice programme, avoiding a discussion with a host government altogether – although 
this in itself brings other challenges (regarding the coordination of efforts, for example). 
 High demands on donor staff time and capacity can be addressed through pooled funds 
or outsourcing management of activities.  
Overall, security and justice programmes with non-state actors requires donors to show greater 
flexibility, political acumen, sensitivity to political changes in balances of power, and tolerance of 
higher levels of ambiguity and uncertainty in their day-to-day work than is generally the case with 
development assistance (Scheye, 2009: vi).  
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Give the time limitations of this rapid review, it was not possible to look at specific security and 
justice programmes working with non-state providers in-depth. However, one example is detailed 
in the box below.  
 
Australian support for non-state security and justice actors in Papua New Guinea 
As detailed earlier, the government in PNG is actively trying to improve the alignment and 
coordination between the state and non-state providers of policing and other justice services. 
The Australian Government has been supportive of the new approach and is providing 
considerable support in the form of the PNG-Australia Law and Justice Partnership (previously 
law and justice sector programme). This includes support for a Community Justice Liaison Unit 
(CJLU) with the explicit task of building bridges between state and non-state mechanisms 
involved in the promotion of social order, safety and justice. The CJLU works with a number of 
NGOs, community-based organisations and state agencies in raising awareness about the work 
of both state and non-state mechanisms and engaging in human rights training.  
Current efforts to develop uniform standards, codes of ethics, protocols for engagement and the 
need to enhance accountability across the law and justice sector (including state and non-state 
actors) are concentrated on building the coordination roles of the Provincial Peace and Good 
Order Committees that bring together a broad spectrum of security and justice providers at 
provincial levels, with a view to gradually devolving this work down to similar mechanisms 
operating at district levels.  
Arguably, this relatively young (at the time of writing) programme demonstrates the greatest 
recognition to date of PNG’s pluralistic environment and the need for holistic engagement. 
Recognising that the lines between state and non-state provision are often indistinct, the policy 
focus is on the intersections between them. Ultimately, the object is to transform both state and 
non-state justice systems, rendering the former more accessible, responsive and accountable, 
whilst gradually bringing the latter into a human rights and rule of law framework. This 
partnership explicitly recognises that the Weberian ideal of the state monopolising security is ill-
suited to the PNG environment and promotes a reconfiguration of security governance that is 
inclusive of both formal and appropriate informal processes. 
Source: Dinnen & McLeod, 2009: 349. 
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